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Selected Legislation and Jurisprudence
∵
European Court of Human Rights
ECHR 2018/11 Case of X v. Russia, 20 February 2018, no. 3150/15 (Third Section)
 The Facts
The applicant, born in 1995, had already been diagnosed with schizotypal 
personality disorder and was being treated, when he was apprehended by the 
police on 24 April 2014 after allegedly harassing a teenager. He was taken to a 
police station and then by ambulance to a psychiatric hospital, where he was 
admitted involuntarily.
The initial examination at the hospital noted his being tense and asking 
for time to “spend with boys”. A further examination carried out a day later 
spoke of the applicant’s wish to have contact with boys, to look like a girl and 
to dye his hair to attract attention. It referred to his having been arrested on 
the street and that he had stalked a boy for months. The applicant demanded 
to be released from hospital on the same day so a panel of doctors examined 
him again.
The panel’s report referred to his desire to meet a particular boy, that he had 
travelled across the city to find him, that he wanted to be “treated gently, to be 
caressed” and that he visited women’s clothing stores. The panel concluded 
that he needed involuntary hospitalisation and the hospital applied for a court 
order on the grounds that the applicant was a danger to himself and others and 
that there was a risk his health would worsen if he was released.
*  These summaries are based on the provisional text of the judgements of the European Court 
of Human Rights. These judgments are still subject to editorial revision before their repro-
duction in Reports of Judgments and Decisions. For the full provisional text, see: http://www.
echr.coe.int.
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A court granted the order in early May 2014, against the applicant’s objec-
tions. The court found that the medical evidence showed that the applicant 
was a danger to himself and others and that his mental state might worsen 
if he was released. He eventually left the hospital after about two weeks. An 
appeal against the court order was rejected in July 2014.
 The Law
 Alleged Violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention
The applicant complained that his involuntary placement in a psychiatric fa-
cility had not been lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention 
(which protects the right of liberty and security of person), owing to the failure 
of the national authorities to meet the substantive requirements for his invol-
untary hospitalisation.
In Winterwerp v. the Netherlands the Court set out three minimum conditions 
which have to be satisfied for the “detention of a person of unsound mind” to 
be lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (e): except in emergency situations 
the individual concerned must be reliably shown to be of unsound mind—
that is to say a true mental disorder must be established before a competent 
authority on the basis of objective medical evidence; the mental disorder must 
be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; and the validity 
of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder.
With regard to the first criterion, in this case the medical professionals and 
the courts were satisfied that the applicant was suffering from a “true mental 
disorder”—namely, schizotypal and organic delusional disorders.
With regard to the second criterion, the Court notes that the grounds for the 
applicant’s involuntary hospitalisation were that 1) he was a danger to himself 
and others and 2) his mental state might significantly deteriorate in the ab-
sence of treatment.
The Court notes that all the medical reports characterised the applicant 
as anxious, irritable, secretive, feeling low, distracted, confused, insincere, re-
served, tense. None of these characteristics—in the absence of evidence or 
indications of verbal or physical aggression, self-mutilation, suicide, etc.—
suggests that the applicant poses a danger to anyone. It must be further noted 
that all the applicant’s medical records paid detailed attention and attached 
decisive importance to the applicant’s change of hair colour, his interest in 
women’s clothes, jewellery, and make-up, and his desire to be fondled and 
caressed and “to spend time with boys”. It is not for the Court to express an 
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opinion on whether these aspects of the applicant’s life, taken alone, can be 
said to demonstrate the existence of any mental disorder; however, in any 
event it does not find them as such to constitute compelling proof that the ap-
plicant posed a danger to anyone.
As regards the second ground for the applicant’s hospitalisation, the Court 
observes that the available medical evidence and judicial decisions contain 
no explanation whatsoever of why and how the applicant’s mental state 
might have significantly deteriorated in the absence of involuntary inpatient 
treatment.
In the Court’s opinion neither the unspecified risks to the applicant’s men-
tal health, nor the long journeys across the city, nor the repeated attempts to 
establish either friendly or romantic relationships were capable of proving 
that the applicant’s condition was of “a kind or degree” warranting compulsory 
confinement. The medical professionals and the domestic courts adduced no 
sufficient and reliable evidence for their decision to hospitalise the applicant 
against his will.
Given the above-mentioned conclusion the Court does not find it necessary 
to examine whether the validity of the applicant’s continued confinement de-
pended upon the persistence of a disorder.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, holds that there has been a viola-
tion of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
ECHR 2018/12 Case of Mehmet Günay and Güllü Günay v. Turkey, 20 February 
2018, no. 52797/08 (Second Section)
The judgment is available only in French.
 The Facts
The applicants, both born in 1969, are the parents of a girl, who died at the 
age of six of cerebral oedema some ten days after undergoing a tonsillectomy 
operation (surgical removal of the palatine tonsils) in hospital.
In 2000, the applicants lodged a prior claim for damages with the minis-
try of health, which was rejected. In 2001 they lodged a claim for compensa-
tion with the administrative court, alleging that their daughter had died as a 
result of mistakes, carelessness and negligence committed by the operating 
surgeon and the duty doctor. At the courts’ request, an initial expert medical 
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assessment was carried out. The experts found that the child’s death had been 
the result of cerebral oedema, the cause of which they had been unable to 
identify. A second expert assessment showed that the child had been admin-
istered 10 g more anaesthetic than the quantity usually given to a child of that 
age and weight, although it noted that her epileptic fits had begun after the 
effects of the anaesthetics had worn off. The report therefore found that the 
anaesthetics had not caused the child’s death.
In 2004 the administrative court, having regard to the findings of the expert 
assessments, dismissed all the applicant’s claims. In 2007 the Council of State 
dismissed their appeal on points of law, and in 2008 it also dismissed their ap-
plication for rectification of that judgment.
 The Law
 Alleged Violation of Article 2 of the Convention
Relying on Article 2 (right to life), the applicants alleged that the domestic pro-
ceedings had failed to identify those responsible for their daughter’s death.
The administrative court based its decision on the reports drawn up by an in-
stitute of forensic medicine. Those reports found that the cause of the girl’s 
death was unidentifiable even though it had occurred subsequently to her 
tonsillectomy; nor had the anaesthetics administered been the cause of death. 
They concluded that no error or negligence was attributable to the medical 
staff in question.
The Court notes that the expert medical assessments and the findings of the 
domestic courts, which are extensively reasoned, ruled out any medical error 
or negligence. It is not its task to question the findings of expert assessments. 
It therefore rejects the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention as being 
manifestly ill-founded.
 Alleged Violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
Relying on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time), the ap-
plicants complained about the length of the proceedings.
The administrative proceedings opened with a prior claim for compensation 
lodged with the authorities on 17 November 2000 and ended on 24 March 2008. 
During that time, the first expert report has been submitted after a period of 
more than 19 months, and following the appeal on points of law, almost four 
years elapsed before the case was heard by the Council of State.
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The Court finds that those excessive administrative procedural delays in 
determining the applicants’ claim for compensation cannot be explained by 
the complexity of the case or by the applicants’ conduct. It considers that a 
delay of some seven years and four months in adjudicating on compensation 
proceedings breached the “reasonable length” requirement.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, holds that there has been a viola-
tion of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
ECHR 2018/13 Case of Mockutė v. Lithuania, 27 February 2018, no. 66490/09 
(Fourth Section)
 The Facts
From 1992 to 2002 the applicant, born in 1973, received occasional treatment 
for various psychiatric conditions, including paranoia and depression. During 
that time, she also obtained a law degree and won a competition to pursue 
post-graduate studies in the United States of America. In 2002 she had profes-
sional and personal difficulties and was diagnosed further with post-traumatic 
stress disorder.
In February 2003 the applicant affiliated herself with the Ojas Meditation 
Centre, a branch of the Osho religious movement, and began practising medi-
tation, which she said brought her “inner healing”. In May 2003 she had a 
breakdown and was forcibly admitted to a psychiatric hospital, where she was 
diagnosed with acute psychosis and where she remained for 52 days. During 
that time, a documentary was aired on national television. It featured the ap-
plicant’s doctor, mother and sister, referred to the Ojas Meditation Centre, and 
discussed the applicant using the pseudonym “Violeta”.
In 2006 the applicant brought a civil claim against the hospital. Following 
a forensic report, the regional court found that she had been unlawfully de-
prived of her liberty during her time at the psychiatric hospital, as she had 
been held against her will and in “outright disregard” for the 48-hour time-
limit, after which time the hospital should have applied for a court order. The 
court further found that the documentary had allowed her to be identified, de-
spite the use of a pseudonym, thus breaching her right to privacy. “By attempt-
ing to alter the applicant’s attitude to non-traditional religion” her freedom of 
religion had also been violated. She was awarded 110,000 LTL (EUR 31,850) in 
respect of non-pecuniary damage, with costs.
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The hospital appealed, and the following year the court of appeal upheld 
the lower court’s decision on deprivation of liberty but overturned the findings 
on privacy and religious freedom. In particular, it stated that the evidence as 
a whole was not sufficient to conclude that the interviews had led to a breach 
of confidentiality and that the information on her diagnosis provided to her 
mother could not be regarded as a breach of her right to privacy. Furthermore, 
the doctors’ critical approach to her meditative practices had not in itself re-
stricted her freedom of religion. The damages were reduced and costs were 
awarded against her. An appeal on points of law by the applicant was refused.
 The Law
 Alleged Violation of Article 8 of the Convention
The applicant complained that a psychiatrist of the hospital had disclosed in-
formation about her health and private life to the journalists of the television 
documentary and her mother. She relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which 
protects the right to respect for private life.
 General Principles
The Court reiterates that personal information relating to a patient belongs to 
his or her private life. The protection of personal data, not least medical data, 
is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to 
respect for private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 
Respecting the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in the legal 
systems of all the Contracting Parties to the Convention. It is crucial not only 
to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to preserve his or her confi-
dence in the medical profession and in the health services in general. Without 
such protection, those in need of medical assistance may be deterred from re-
vealing such information of a personal and intimate nature as may be neces-
sary in order to receive appropriate treatment and, even, from seeking such 
assistance, thereby endangering their own health and, in the case of transmis-
sible diseases, that of the community. The domestic law must therefore afford 
appropriate safeguards to prevent any such communication or disclosure of 
personal health data as may be inconsistent with the guarantees in Article 8 
of the Convention.
 Whether There Was Interference with the Applicant’s Right to 
Respect for Her Private Life
Although some of the circumstances of this case are not entirely clear, it tran-
spires from the record of the regional court’s hearing that after the applicant 
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had been admitted to the psychiatric hospital without her consent on 7 May 
2003, her mother contacted the journalists of the television documentary and 
told them where the applicant was being held, but that she did not know her 
daughter’s diagnosis.
For her part, the psychiatrist testified at the hearing that when the journal-
ists had come to that hospital, she had been asked by the hospital’s administra-
tion to meet them and told that the “talk would be about Mockutė”, an aspect 
of the case which the Court finds particularly disturbing. The regional court 
held that the psychiatrist, without obtaining the applicant’s consent, had re-
vealed information to the journalists about her diagnosis, acute psychosis, the 
fact that she was being treated at that hospital, and that she had studied in 
the United States. The Court further observes that the psychiatrist used such 
statements as “it does not appear that this young woman would participate in 
orgies” and that “she is not hypersexual”. In this context it recalls the State’s ob-
ligation to protect information about a person’s sexual life and moral integrity.
In deciding whether there was an interference with the applicant’s right 
to respect for her privacy, the Court also notes that under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was adopted 
in 2007, the States’ have a duty to protect persons with disabilities from un-
lawful attacks on their honour and reputation (see Article 22 of the CRDP). 
Examining further, the Court observes that the psychiatrist also discussed the 
applicant as manifesting secretive behaviour, which was a trait of those be-
longing to sects. The Court is also mindful of the applicant’s argument that she 
experienced emotional insecurity because she was afraid of which of the ad-
ditional facts the psychiatrist had forced out of her might have been revealed 
to the journalists.
It has not been contested that the psychiatric hospital is a public hospital 
and that the acts and omissions of its administration and medical staff were 
capable of engaging the responsibility of the respondent State under the 
Convention.
The Court finds that the disclosure by the psychiatrist to the journalists of 
highly personal and sensitive confidential information about the applicant, 
obtained during her involuntary hospitalisation and treatment at that hospi-
tal, entailed an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private 
life guaranteed by paragraph 1 of Article 8.
Lastly, the Court turns to the applicant’s complaint that the psychiatric hos-
pital revealed information about her state of health to her mother. Although 
the Government disputed that such a disclosure had taken place, the Court 
notes that the court of appeal did not deny such a fact, but instead stated that 
the hospital had been entitled to act in that way. Given the applicant’s state-
ments about her tense relationship with her mother, the Court is also ready to 
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concede that disclosure by the hospital of information about the applicant’s 
health to her mother, whichever form it might have taken, also amounted to an 
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her private life.
 Whether the Interference Was Justified
The Court finds it clear that the applicant did not give her consent to the psy-
chiatrist or the hospital to discuss her state of health, her sexual life or her 
beliefs, either with the journalists or with her mother. Furthermore, the Court 
fails to see the legal grounds justifying the release of such information, wheth-
er under Lithuanian law or under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Even if there 
were exceptions to the rule of non-disclosure, none of those have been argued 
by the Government, which instead pleaded a legitimate aim of informing soci-
ety about new religious movements. The interference with the applicant’s right 
to respect for her private life was therefore not “in accordance with the law” 
within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.
Lastly, as to the legal basis for disclosing information related to the appli-
cant’s health to her mother, the Court observes that the appeal court focused 
its analysis on the proportionality of the interference, in particular, on the 
fact that the applicant’s mother had known of her history of mental troubles, 
without citing any legal basis for such a disclosure. The Government did not 
specify one either. That being so, the Court cannot but hold that the psychiat-
ric hospital’s release of information about the applicant’s health to her moth-
er, whichever form it might have taken, was likewise not “in accordance with 
the law”.
 Alleged Violation of Article 9 of the Convention
The applicant complained of a violation of her right to practise her religion on 
account of the restrictive environment at the psychiatric hospital and because 
the psychiatrists had persuaded her to have a critical attitude towards her re-
ligion. She relied on Article 9 of the Convention, which protects the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
 On the Existence of an Interference
The Court firstly notes that the Government did acknowledge that the right 
to practise one’s religion in accordance with the Osho teaching fell within the 
scope of Article 9 of the Convention. The Court has no reason to hold otherwise, 
all the more so since pursuant to the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision 
the Ojas Meditation Center had been registered as a religious community.
The Court finds that it has been presented with diverging accounts of the 
applicant’s factual situation in the psychiatric hospital. In principle it is not 
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the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the 
domestic courts. Even so, the Court has already held that, in a situation like 
this, it remains free to itself evaluate the facts in the light of all the material at 
its disposal. It has also held that the position of inferiority and powerlessness 
which is typical of patients confined in psychiatric hospitals calls for increased 
vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with.
Examining further, the Court turns to the applicant’s twofold argument that 
at the psychiatric hospital she had been prevented from practicing her reli-
gion, firstly, because of restrictive regime therein, and, secondly, because of the 
doctors’ unsympathetic views towards her beliefs. The Court notes that, after 
the applicant was placed in the hospital, she was forcibly administered drugs, 
physically restrained, and various restrictive treatment regimes were applied 
to her during the fifty-two days of her stay at that institution. The Government 
have not suggested that the applicant could have left the hospital to practise 
her religion with the circle of people with whom she shared it, even though she 
had clearly indicated to the psychiatrists that attending the Ojas Meditation 
Center “brought her peace”. In fact, the regional court had clearly ruled out any 
possibility for the applicant to leave the hospital for 52 days of her stay therein. 
In the hospital she had to submit and subordinate her wishes to unyielding 
authority of the psychiatrists who were trying to “correct” the applicant so that 
she abandoned her “fictitious” religion, and whom she felt constrained to obey, 
even on pain of receiving a diagnosis which would make her unemployable. 
The applicant therefore has demonstrated that pressure was exerted on her to 
change her religious beliefs and prevent her from manifesting them.
While it is for the medical authorities to decide on the therapeutic methods 
to be used, if necessary by force, to preserve the physical and mental health of 
patients who are entirely incapable of deciding for themselves, the Court must 
nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been convincingly 
shown to exist. In this case the psychiatrists who attended to the applicant ad-
mitted themselves that the applicant’s life “had not been in danger” for all fifty-
two days of her stay at the psychiatric hospital. This view was also confirmed 
by the court-appointed experts.
The Court holds that there has been an interference with the applicant’s 
right to respect for her religion.
 Whether the Interference Was Justified
The above-mentioned interference contravened Article 9 of the Convention 
unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims 
referred to in paragraph 2 of that Article and was “necessary in a democratic 
society” for achieving such aim or aims.
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In the present case, however, it is sufficient to note that, except for the first 
day of her involuntary hospitalisation, the applicant was held at the psychiat-
ric hospital unlawfully. Given that the applicant’s psycho-correction treatment 
in fact continued throughout her stay at that institution, the Court finds that 
the interference was not “prescribed by law”.
The Court also attaches weight to the fact that, under the Lithuanian 
Constitution and the Constitutional Court’s case-law, freedom of religion be-
comes a matter of legal regulation only to the extent that an individual ex-
presses his or her thoughts or religion by actions, and that, as long as a person 
has a religion or faith, it falls within the inviolable sphere of private life and 
may not be limited in any way. The Court is prepared to accept that the needs 
of psychiatric treatment might necessitate discussing various matters, includ-
ing religion, with a patient, when he or she is being treated by a psychiatrist. 
That being so, it does not transpire from Lithuanian law that such discussions 
might also take the form of psychiatrists prying into the patients’ beliefs in 
order to “correct” them when there is no clear and imminent risk that such 
beliefs will manifest in actions dangerous to the patient or others.
For these reasons, the Court holds, unanimously, that there has been a viola-
tion of Article 8 of the Convention; and, by five votes to two, that there has 
been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.
Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Yudkivska and Ranzoni, defending the 
view that the applicant was not pressured to change her religious beliefs, but 
her treatment was based on her completely uncritical attitude towards those 
beliefs and, in particular, towards her psychotic behaviour.
Joseph Dute
Professor of Health Law, Faculty of Law, Radboud University, Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands
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